Although the escalation literature has grown steadily over the past 20 years, there has been very little research bridging the gap between laboratory experiments and qualitative field studies on escalation. What has been missing are quantitative tests of escalation hypotheses in their natural context. This study helps fill such a gap by testing the responsibility hypothesis within the banking industry. It was predicted that the turnover of senior bank managers would lead to a deescalation of commitment to problem loans. Data collected from 132 California banks over a 9-year period showed that bank executive turnover predicted both provisions for loan losses and the write-off of bad loans. In contrast, provisions and write-offs were not found to influence executive turnover. The implications of these results are discussed in terms of both the escalation literature and practical ways to improve decision making in the banking industry.
During the 1980s, the United States experienced a breakdown in its savings and loan (S&L) industry and a near bankruptcy of its commercial banking system. At the heart of these financial maladies was the enormous quantity of bad debt incurred by financial institutions. Problem loans not only created major losses for the nation's banks and S&Ls (often wiping put all of their stockholders' equity) but also contributed to unprecedented losses for governmental organizations charged with insuring bank and S&L depositors. Because of the sheer magnitude of the problem, restoring financial health to the U.S. banking system was a lengthy and expensive process, one that contributed substantially to the national debt as well as a reduction in economic growth (Foust, McNamee, Hawkins, & Neff, 1991 The causes of the banking and S&L crises have been and will continue to be debated by economists and public commentators well into the future (e.g., Meehan & Woolley, 1991; Smith, 1993) . Whereas most public attention has been on economic and regulatory issues, we consider it important to ask whether behavioral research can shed light on these important events. One possibility is escalation research. Studies of escalation have been concerned with how individuals and organizations cope with situations in which major losses have occurred (Brockner & Rubin, 1985; Staw & Ross, 1987; Teger, 1980) . The principal contribution of escalation research has been to identify a tendency to remain committed to losing courses of action, sometimes to the extent of ' 'throwing good money after bad. '' If escalation research can be applied to the financial context, we might explain why financial institutions do not always withdraw from problem loans in a timely fashion. We might also be able to see whether there exists such a thing as "bad loan psychology" (Lewicki, 1980) where some banks fail to recognize weaknesses in their portfolios, only to suffer greater losses over time. Answers to these questions could certainly help managers of financial institutions deal with future economic downturns when the U.S. financial system may again be faced with a large debt load. Such answers might also have implications in other economies experiencing financial difficulties. For example, in Japan according to recent reports (WuDunn, 1995) , the banking sector has suffered from many of the same problems that affected U.S. financial institutions in the late 1980s:
The Ministry of Finance has said that the nation's lending institutions are sitting on bad debt worth 40 trillion yen, $450 billion at current exchange rates, or 9.5 percent of Japan's annual economic output. This official estimate is about equal to the combined equity of all Japanese banks, but many analysts say the amount of bad loans may be significantly higher. . . . The mountain of bad debt-and the uncertainty over its exact dimension-is weakening the heart of Japanese financial system, (pp. C1-C2) Given the enormous scale of loan losses and the difficulty of recovering from such losses, any theoretical approach that can explain even a small portion of this problem could have significant economic consequences.
If escalation research can be usefully applied to the banking sector, such an exercise would also have important ramifications for the study of escalation itself. To date, most escalation research has consisted of laboratory studies testing psychological explanations of commitment to losing courses of action (see Bowen, 1987; Brockner, 1992; Northcraft & Wolf, 1984; Staw, 1997; Whyte, 1986 , for reviews and critiques). A major shortcoming of this line of research has been the absence of findings on real managerial decisions taking place in on-going organizational settings.
A few escalation studies have attempted to provide greater external validity. Garland (1990) and Jeffrey (1992) used business practitioners rather than students in simulated decision situations. There have also been several qualitative case studies describing ways in which organizations become embroiled in losing courses of action and what actions they take to extricate themselves from such predicaments (e.g., Drummond, 1994; Lipshitz, 1995; Ross & Staw, 1986 , 1993 . However, still largely missing from the escalation literature is a stream of quantitative research testing escalation hypotheses in the organizational context. We are aware of only four quantitative studies in which escalation hypotheses have been confirmed or falsified in their natural settings. Two of these studies did not involve typical organizational or business decisions; they were Arkes and Blumer's (1985;  Experiment 2) study of theater attendance and Staw and Hoang's (1995) analysis of playing time in professional basketball.
The only studies that have tested escalation in a conventional business setting have been Schoorman (1988) and McCarthy, Schoorman, and Cooper (1993) . Schoorman found that employees' performance evaluations were influenced by whether supervisors had originally hired the employees. McCarthy et al. found that entrepreneurs who started their own businesses subsequently invested greater additional capital than those who had purchased existing businesses from others. Although these studies suggest that escalation effects may extend from the laboratory to the field, there is obviously a need for further quantitative analysis of real-world data. Therefore, research on how financial institutions deal with problem loans would add significantly to the escalation literature.
Escalation and Problem Loans
Escalation research might be applied to a range of decisions concerning problem loans. For example, one might apply the escalation paradigm to banking decisions about expanding the size of a loan (or lengthening its terms) so that a troubled business can modernize its equipment and stay competitive. The paradigm could also apply to the actions banks take to recover their principal, such as taking additional collateral or calling loans for violations of their debt covenants. Finally, the paradigm can be used to examine how banks cope with the eventuality of loss. Our research uses data on how much money banks set aside for future losses, as well as the write-off of problem loans, to investigate persistence versus withdrawal in the banking industry.
To apply psychological research on a topic such as escalation, it is useful to start with a hypothesis that is central to the literature. Best suited for this role would be a prediction involving personal responsibility. Not only has personal responsibility played a major part in theories of escalation (e.g., Brockner, 1992; Staw & Ross, 1987) , but it has also been the focus of a great deal of empirical research. It has been demonstrated that those responsible for decisions leading to losses are more likely to persist or invest further in the losing course of action (see, e.g., Bazerman, Beekun, & Schoorman, 1982; Davis & Bobko, 1986; Schoorman, 1988; Staw, 1976; Whyte, 1991) .
Self-justification, or dissonance theory (Aronson, 1972; Festinger, 1957) , has often been invoked to explain the effects of personal responsibility. It is hypothesized that people who are responsible for prior losses attempt to rationalize their mistakes, not only by biasing information pertaining to their choices but also by persisting in them. By committing additional time, money, or effort to a course of action, decision makers may attempt to turn around a troubled project, product, or policy. By either sticking with or adding resources to a losing course of action, decision makers may try to vindicate themselves. Yet trying to prove to themselves or others (Staw, 1980 ) that they have not made an error may expose them to further losses (Brockner & Rubin, 1985; Staw & Ross, 1987) .
There have obviously been other theoretical explanations for commitment to a losing course of action. The most straightforward alternative is that choices to persist or escalate may simply be a function of the economic prospects facing decision makers in adverse situations. Even though losses have been suffered, the decision to continue in a course of action could be objectively warranted if future revenues exceed future costs (Northcraft & Wolf, 1984) . We neither dispute the importance of economic rewards nor the possibility that persistence can at times result in turnaround or recovery. The central argument is not that persistence will always result in economic loss but that some noneconomic variables such as self-justification may have a significant influence on behavior. Thus, if it can be shown that responsibility for losses affects the way bankers deal with problem loans, then such a tendency would be an important (noneconomic) addition to the understanding of business behavior.
Self-justification has not been the only theory to make noneconomic predictions about escalation. Prospect theory (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979) predicts that people are generally risk averse in positive or gain situations and risk seeking under losing scenarios. Thus, when individuals face a losing course of action, they may be quite willing to risk further losses in the hopes of turning the situation around (Bazerman, 1984; Whyte, 1986) . Therefore, a general tendency to escalate or persist in losing situations can be predicted as easily by prospect theory as the justification hypothesis. Nevertheless, it is possible to distinguish between the models. Although both theories emphasize people's desire to avoid losses, only the justification approach is specific about the origin of such motivation. The justification approach makes explicit predictions regarding the behavior of those who have high and low responsibility for losses, whereas prospect theory makes no such distinction.
Responsibility Effects
A direct application of self-justification might involve testing how responsibility affects the ability of financial officers to cope with problem loans. For example, one could predict that bankers who have been closely associated with decisions to fund problem loans are the ones to show the greatest difficulty in acknowledging the subsequent risks of these loans and the likelihood of default. In contrast, bankers who have not been associated with these funding decisions may find it easier to accept the possibility of future losses, and they may be able to write off losses as they materialize.
Testing the responsibility hypothesis does not, however, have to involve the tracing of loan decisions to each originating officer. It is reasonable to assume that most of the top management of a bank holds at least some responsibility for its lending activity. In bank lending, the largest loans must generally be approved by the highest officers of an institution. Senior managers are responsible for setting general credit guidelines that others follow in making specific loan decisions, and they are often rewarded for the success of the bank, including its lending practices. Therefore, having been a member of a bank's past management team implies some degree of responsibility for prior loan decisions. Either by taking specific actions on prior loans or by involvement in past policies and procedures, managers may be associated with previous banking decisions. Thus, turnover in bank management can be considered as a natural reduction in responsibility for prior loan decisions. This change in responsibility may in turn influence how problem loans are dealt with over time.
Testing for responsibility effects can also make use of aggregated data on coping with loan losses. Instead of following the actions of banks for each problem loan, it is possible to explore how banks have dealt with their entire loan portfolios. Each year, managers of financial institutions must decide how much money to set aside as a provision for future loan losses. They must also determine how much of their loan portfolios are to be written off as uncollectible. The provision for loan losses reflects the possibility of future defaults, delays in payment, and reductions in the repayment of principal; write-offs are a final reporting of the occurrence or inevitability of such losses. Although both these figures are part of a bank's regular financial accounting, they reflect management's judgment of its loan portfolio rather than a mechanical reporting of objective reality (Patten, 1983) . Therefore, it is possible to consider these financial data as actions potentially influenced by psychological as well as economic variables. Staw and Ross (1987) hypothesized that turnover of those responsible for a losing course of action reduces escalation tendencies. Turnover was predicted to reduce a psychological source of commitment because those people who have reason to defend or justify a course of action would no longer be present to promote such a position. As a deescalation technique (Ross & Staw, 1991) , turnover has thus been viewed as an antidote to responsibility effects. Managerial turnover exchanges those who are responsible for prior losses for new managers who have had no such responsibility. Like those in the low-responsibility condition of experimental studies (e.g., Staw, 1976) , new executives should be able to evaluate a course of action on its objective merits, without having their judgments colored by the experience of prior policy decisions.
As logical as the above argument may seem, managerial turnover has never been directly tested as a means of reducing commitment to a losing course of action. Therefore, in context of commercial banking, we predicted:
Managerial turnover will be associated with greater provision for loan losses. (Hypothesis 1) Managerial turnover will be associated with greater writeoff of loan losses. (Hypothesis 2) Underlying both hypotheses is the assumption that man-agerial turnover reduces responsibility for losses. If such an explanation is correct, we might expect turnover effects to vary in accordance with the responsibility various parties have had in the management of banks. Therefore, the strongest effects would be expected for the turnover of banks' operating executives because they set general credit policies, approve the largest loans, and are hierarchically responsible for bank performance. Weaker effects might be expected for nonoperating bank officers. Turnover on a bank's board of directors might be expected to have only minimal effects, inasmuch as board members are not directly involved in day-to-day management decisions and may not even be experts in the businesses they serve. In fact, board members have often been described as passive observers of an organization's affairs (e.g., Pennings, 1980) . Thus, we expected turnover effects to be stronger for operating managers than for boards of directors.
Turnover effects could also vary by the type of managerial succession they entail. Although turnover generally involves some changes in responsibility, the magnitude of these changes may depend on the nature of succession. When turnover involves bringing in an executive from outside the bank, substantial change in responsibility should result. When a bank executive is replaced by an insider, there may be some residual of responsibility carried forward from one position to the next. Thus, we expected to find the strongest effects of turnover when it involved outside rather than inside succession.
Testing Escalation in the Financial Context
If escalation research is to have implications for the way financial institutions cope with problem loans, it would be useful to demonstrate such an effect with a substantial number of banks. Thus, instead of conducting a laboratory study on simulated bank lending or even a field study on loan decisions at a particular bank, we decided to investigate escalation with aggregated data on a panel of banks. Using longitudinal data on the population of California banks, we examined the effects of executive turnover on provisions for loan loss and the writeoff of problem loans. To check for reverse causation, we also analyzed the effects of loan losses on the turnover of senior bank management. Thus turnover was investigated as both a cause and consequence of the way top managers coped with problem loans.
Method

Sample and Data Sources
The sample for this research consisted of 132 California banks. Included in the study was nearly the entire population of domestic, regional, and independent banks in business from 1979 to 1987, with the exception of four banks for which dependent variable data were missing. Although the California economy is diverse, examining banks from a single state provided us with some control for conditions that might affect a single geographic region. For the banks in the sample, assets ranged from approximately $2.9 million to $2.4 billion, with an average of $140.7 million in assets. The sample had a mean of $81.3 million in total loans and had been in business for an average of 24 years. Of the sampled banks, 72% were publicly traded.
The data for this study came from annual editions of California Banks Book (Findley, 1979 (Findley, -1988 . These reports contain detailed year-end financial and operating data, as well as the names and tenure information of the executives and board of directors for each bank. They are edited compendiums of annual data from other sources such as the Uniform Call Report filed by all commercial banks insured with the Federal Deposit Insurance Corp., as well as reports from other federal and state banking agencies.
Management Turnover
Turnover was computed for the following bank executive groups: (a) bank presidents, CEOs, and chairs; (b) other bank senior management (executive and senior vice-presidents, chief operating officers, vice chairs, chief financial officers, controllers, and cashiers); and (c) outside members of the banks' boards of directors.
Turnover was calculated as the percentage of the total number of people in each of the three management groups leaving a bank per year. Turnover was indicated when a bank executive was recorded as working for the bank during a given year but not listed by the bank during the subsequent year. For example, if an executive was reported as CEO in 1980 but not in 1981, then he or she was coded as "turning over" in 1981. Because California Banks Books list executives at year's end, turnover at Time T could have occurred anytime from 1 month to 12 months into the calendar year. For turnover at Time T -\, executives could have been out of their positions from 13 to 24 months. Only senior management and board members who left the bank entirely were included in the turnover data.
Coping With Problem Loans
Although problem loan data are accounting representations by banks, they are not, as noted above, a simple aggregation of economic value. The true value of problem loans (e.g., questionable real estate and business loans) is quite difficult to ascertain because it depends on a host of business and economic factors that may affect the likelihood of debt repayment. During the 1980s, banks differed widely in their interpretation of accounting requirements (Singer, 1985) . Some acted in a conservative manner toward their portfolios by recognizing problem loans and adding to reserves sufficient funds to take care of potential defaults. Other banks were less likely to acknowledge problems with their outstanding loans and added few reserves for potential defaults. Although federal bank examiners, following an audit, could exert pressure on banks to recognize potential loan losses, the evaluation of a bank's loan portfolio was primarily the responsibility of bank management. We used three common bank-ing statistics as indicators of how bank managers coped with potential loan losses.
Provision for loan loss. The provision for loan loss is the amount of money a bank sets aside in a given year in anticipation of nonperforming or uncollectible loans (American Bankers Association, 1989 ). This allocation of funds appears on the income statement as an operating expense. Because the provision for loan loss directly decreases bank earnings for the year, it is not taken lightly. It is made only after careful scrutiny of the loan portfolio and reflects a willingness to accept that future losses are likely to occur. Obviously, the size of the provision for loan loss is highly dependent on the size of a bank's portfolio. To control for differences in bank size, we divided the provision for loan loss by the bank's total outstanding loans. The adjusted provision for loan loss in our sample had a mean of .0078 (SD = .0095).
Net loan loss. Net loan loss is the final accounting write-off of loans as losses. Writing off a loan means that it is considered uncollectible and, therefore, under standard accounting rules, it no longer qualifies as an active bank asset (Patten, 1983) . Net loan loss is the residual of all write-offs taken during the year, less any unanticipated recoveries during the year from loans previously written off (Bank Administration Institute, 1984) . Because net loan loss may also vary widely by the size of a bank's loan portfolio, it was divided by banks' total outstanding loans. The adjusted net loan loss in this sample was .0065 (SD = .0108).
Loan loss reserve. Loan loss reserve represents the accumulated funds set aside for future loan losses. This reserve is listed on the balance sheet. It is increased by the yearly provision for loan loss (an expense item) and decreased by loan write-offs (American Bankers Association, 1989). Because loan loss reserve is an accumulated balance, it can affect whether a bank considers it necessary to make further provisions for loan losses in any given year. In addition, having placed money into a reserve earlier may influence willingness to write off problem loans as uncollectible (or losses). Therefore, we use the loan loss reserve as a control variable in the analyses. This variable was also adjusted by the bank's total loans. The mean for adjusted provision for loan loss was .0124 (SD = .0099).
Statistical Analysis
Our analyses were conducted on 9 years of cross-sectional records (1979) (1980) (1981) (1982) (1983) (1984) (1985) (1986) (1987) for all 132 California banks in the dataset. To test the predictions of the responsibility hypothesis, we used pooled cross-sectional time-series analysis (PCSTS). This procedure allowed us to account for the effect of years, individual banks, and other specified control variables. The selection of this technique was also based on the primary theoretical consideration that effects of escalation reside within firms and occur over time.
If our estimates in these analyses have been biased by factors we could not observe, such biases might create differences between firms on our dependent variables that are spuriously attributed to our predictor variables. Such biases could arise due to (a) differences among firms in omitted variables that are constant over time (e.g., some firms being generally more conservative than others in their recognition of potential loan losses) or (b) differences over years in omitted variables that are constant across firms (e.g., in some years, federal bank examiners may have applied more pressure on banks to recognize potential loan losses). These omitted variables might be correlated with both our independent and dependent variables. To prevent the possibility of spurious inferences, we included fixed firm effects and fixed year effects. That is, we included a dummy variable for each firm, giving each firm its own mean, or constant. Likewise, we included a dummy variable for each year. This fixed effects approach was used rather than the alternative random effects specification sometimes used in PCSTS because we had virtually the entire population of California banks operating over our 9-year observation period rather than a random sample. We also used a fixed effects mode] because we were interested in explaining within-firm processes (i.e., turnover leading to writeoffs ) rather than between-firm differences in coping with problem loans.
In using a fixed-effects specification (Judge, Griffiths, Hill, & Lee, 1985) for both the firm and year controls, with lagged independent variables as predictors, the dependent variable for bank ; at time t, y, .,, is modeled in PCSTS as
In this equation, a, is the effect or intercept of firm /: < = 1 . . . N, where N is the number of banks; y, is the effect or intercept of year I : t = 1 . . . T, where T is the number of years; /?, is the within-firm slope of our hypothesized independent variable, relative turnover, pooled over all firms and all years; /?,, j = 2 . . . J, are the within-firm slopes for our control variables, jj, pooled over all firms and years; and e,, is a normally distributed error term.
Because the primary dependent variables are skewed and only approximately continuous, the strict assumptions of the normal regression model may be violated. However, even though truncation and skewness are potentially problematic, these features are shared by the independent variables or are accounted for by the firm effects, allowing us to make the a priori working assumption of symmetric disturbances. In other words, it is the between-firm distributions that are skewed and not the withinfirm distributions. We confirmed the validity of this assumption with diagnostic plots in a post hoc residual analysis.
An additional advantage of the PCSTS analysis is that it allows us to estimate and control for autocorrelation. Autocorrelation may bias parameter estimates because of factors that change over time within firms but are not included in the model. For example, firms may have cycles of lending practices that have naturally evolving patterns that change in coherent hut unforeseeable ways over time. Therefore, for each of the models reported, we estimated the effect of a serial correlation term in a first-order autoregrcssive model, as described in Hsiao ( 1986, pp. 54-55) , after having controlled for the lagged independent variables. In none of these analyses did we find significant residual autocorrelation.
A remaining issue in obtaining fixed effects estimates is that of collinearity among the predictor variables. Although we might expect turnover in the various managerial groups to be somewhat intercorrelated (e.g., as CEOs leave they may take Note. All measures taken over all bank-years except where data were missing from Findley (1979 Findley ( -1988 .
• In millions. b In thousands.
other managers with them), the correlations among these independent variables were quite modest. In order to examine the effects of turnover from each group, we first estimated the effect of each group alone in separate regressions. We then included all groups in an additional model so as to assess the effects of each group's turnover holding the other groups constant.
Control Variables
As noted, the pooled cross-sectional time series model specifically controls for year and bank effects. In addition, adjusted loan loss reserves (at T -1) were used to control for prior bank provisions for loan loss. We also controlled for the tenure of each management group, which was operationalized as the mean years in position for each group at Time 7" -1. We did this because the seniority of those leaving a bank could have affected how the institution dealt with loan losses over time, as well as influenced when the senior management team would turn over. Finally, we included total assets as an additional control for bank size because growth in bank assets might have been associated with particular lending practices or the way banks dealt with problem loans over time.
Results
The means and standard deviations of some key financial indicators for the 132 banks averaged for the years 1979 through 1987 are shown in Table 1. Table 2 shows the means and standard deviations of turnover and tenure for the three groups of bank executives averaged for 1979-1987. Relative turnover for bank presidents was .10, for the other senior managers it was .18, and for the outside directors it was .08. The zero-order correlations between the independent, dependent, and control variables are reported in Table 3 . Tables 4 and 5 show the results of the pooled crosssectional time series analyses. These analyses were performed to examine whether turnover of bank executives at T -1 would be associated with increases in provision Note. All measures taken over all bank-years except where data were missing from Findley (1979 Findley ( -1988 . Measures taken over those banks with at least 1 person in the relevant group. CEOs = chief executive officers; COOs = chief operating officers. Note. Group I = bank presidents, chief executive officers, and chairs; Group 2 -bank vice-presidents, chief operating officers, vice-chairs, chief financial officers, controllers, and cashiers; Group 3 = bank outside directors. *p<.05. **p<.OI. ***/)<.001.
for loan loss, as well as increases in net loan losses at Time T. Control variables were adjusted loan loss reserves, assets, and years of tenure for each of the management groups at T -1, as well as bank and year effects.
As expected, there were significant effects for some of the control variables. Loan loss reserves significantly predicted net loan loss in each of the regression models.
Total bank assets was also a significant predictor of both provision for loan loss and write-offs. However, there were few significant effects of years in position (or tenure) on either of the dependent variables.
As shown in Tables 4 and 5 Note. All models include firm and year-fixed effects (dummy coded). Relative turnover indicates total turnover divided by the total number of individuals in each group. Group 1 = bank presidents, chief executive officers, and chairs; Group 2 = bank vice-presidents, chief operating officers, vice-chairs, chief financial officers, controllers, and cashiers; Group 3 = bank outside directors.
a Adjusted for total loans. **p < .01. *** p < .001, two-tailed, Note. All models include firm and year-fixed effects (dummy coded). Relative turnover indicates total turnover divided by the total number of individuals in each group. Group 1 = bank presidents, chief executive officers, and chairs; Group 2 = bank vice-presidents, chief operating officers, vice-chairs, chief financial officers, controllers, and cashiers; Group 3 = bank outside directors. a Adjusted for total loans. */)<.05. **p<.01. ***p < .001, two-tailed.
otherwise noted. Turnover of other senior executives also predicted loan loss provisions (B = .0053, p < .001) and write-offs (B = .0041, p < .001). There were neither significant turnover effects for bank directors on provisions (B = .0013, ns) nor write-offs (B = .0003, ns). When the two categories of operating officers were combined into a single management group, there were significant differences in the turnover effects of managers versus outside board members; r(885) = 2.97, p < .002, onetailed, for provision; f(885) = 3.11,p < .001, one-tailed, for net loan loss. Tables 4 and 5 also show the equations (Model 4) in which turnover data for all three groups of bank executives were entered simultaneously. Because the intercorrelations of turnover among various groups of bank executives was modest (all rs < .18), we did not observe any evidence of collinearity. The regression analyses again demonstrated that the relative turnover of top managers at T -1 significantly predicted both adjusted provision for loan loss (B = .003, p < .01) and adjusted net loan loss at Time T (B = .0046, p < .001). The relative turnover of other senior managers showed similar effects (B = .0041, p < .001, for provisions; and B = .0023, p < .05, for write-offs). However, once again, turnover of outside board members did not predict either provision for loan loss or net loan loss (B = -.0023, ns, and B = -.0024, ns, respectively).
For those groups showing significant effects, we then examined turnover with inside and outside replacement (using one-tailed tests of significance). The outside replacement of the highest bank officers significantly predicted adjusted provision for loan loss (B = .0041, SE = .0015, p < .005) and adjusted net loan loss (B = .0049, SE = .0016, p < .005). Inside replacement of the highest officers also predicted provisions (B = .0021, SE = .0012, p < .05) and write-offs (B = .0041, SE = .0014, p < .005). For the turnover of other senior managers, outside replacement predicted provisions (B = .0043, SE = .0011, p < .001) and write-offs (B = .0021, SE = .0012, p < .05), whereas inside replacement was not significantly associated with either of the dependent variables (B = .002, SE = .0018, ns, for provisions, and B = .0027, SE = .0020, ns, for write-offs). When the two categories of executives were combined into a single management group, the difference between inside and outside replacement was in the predicted direction (but did not reach conventional levels of significance) on provision for loan loss, f(864) = 1.51, p < .06, one-tailed, and there was no difference in write-offs, f(864) = 0.06, ns.
To clarify the causality of the findings, we conducted a second set of analyses. We examined whether loan losses could lead to the turnover of bank executives rather than the causal ordering assumed in this research. Thus, provision for loan loss and net loan loss at T -1 were-used to predict the turnover of each management group at Time T. So as to control for the effects of normal retirement (in addition to bank effects, year effects, and assets), we also included the mean tenure of each management group as a control variable.
The results of this second set of pooled time series analyses can be seen in Tables 6 and 7 . As in previous analyses, there were some significant effects of the control variables. The effect of bank assets indicated that as firms increased in size, they experienced more turnover. There Note. All models include firm and year-fixed effects (dummy coded). Relative turnover indicates total turnover divided by the total number of individuals in each group. Group 1 -bank presidents, chief executive officers, and chairs; Group 2 -bank vice-presidents, chief operating officers, vice-chairs, chief financial officers, controllers, and cashiers; Group 3 -bank outside directors. a Adjusted for total loans. */; < .05. **p<.01. ***;><.001.
also were significant effects of years in position, showing that the longer managers or directors were in their positions, the greater was the likelihood they would leave the banks. Although this latter finding is different from the common observation of a negative relationship between tenure and turnover, it should be recognized that bank executives are older and more experienced than those usually surveyed in organizational research (e.g., Price, 1977; Price & Mueller, 1981) . Thus, as these executives gained in tenure (and aged), they were more likely to retire or leave their banking positions. Tables 6 and 7 show the effects of lagged provision for loan loss and lagged net loan loss on turnover. There were no effects of provision or loan loss on turnover in the two management groups. There was one significant effect of lagged provisions on the turnover of outside directors, but a similar effect was not evidenced for loan losses on outside director turnover. In case a 1-year lag was insufficient time for poor performance to have led to executive turnover, we conducted some additional analyses. We examined the effects of provision for loan loss and net loan loss with 2-and 3-year time lags. No significant relationships were found. We also conducted analyses in which provisions and loan losses were added across the 3 years (to create a measure of cumulative loss), and still no effects were found.
Discussion
As predicted, turnover in banks' operating management was significantly associated with the way banks dealt with problem loans. The effects of management turnover were Note. All models include firm and year-fixed effects (dummy coded). Relative turnover indicates total turnover divided by the total number of individuals in each group. Group 1 = bank presidents, chief executive officers, and chairs; Group 2 = bank vice-presidents, chief operating officers, vice-chairs, chief financial officers, controllers, and cashiers; Group 3 = bank outside directors. Q Adjusted for total loans. *p < .05. **/> < .01. ***p < .001.
consistent across both the dependent measures, provision for loan loss and the write-off of bad loans. Also, as expected, there were significant differences between the effects of management and board turnover. Although there were significant effects of management turnover on both provisions and write-offs, the turnover of board members was not significant for either of the dependent variables. Contrasts between the effects of management and board turnover were also significant, showing that the turnover of operating executives was a stronger predictor than board turnover. These findings are logical, given that operating managers are generally responsible for a bank's functioning, whereas members of the board serve in a more distant oversight capacity.
There was only weak support for the distinction between outside and inside succession. For the broad group of senior managers, the expected pattern emerged in which outside but not inside succession predicted provisions and write-offs. However, for the highest bank officers the effects were significant for both inside and outside replacement. Contrasts using both management groups showed a predicted, although nonsignificant, difference between inside and outside succession on one of the two dependent variables. Therefore, although there was some evidence to support the succession argument, we found that it was not sufficient to draw firm conclusions about whether outside replacement was always the stronger determinant of coping with problem loans.
Overall, the data on turnover effects provided a reasonably good fit with the responsibility hypothesis. There were turnover effects for two groups of operating executives, and these effects were significant across the two dependent variables. There were also significant differences between the effects of management and board turnover. Essentially, the only finding that was unexpected was a significant effect of inside replacement for one of the two management groups.
Prospect theory did not fare so well with the empirical analyses. Because prospect theory is concerned with gain and loss situations, not the effects of responsibility, it would not have predicted any of the effects of executive turnover. Under prospect theory, one would have expected new occupants of executive roles to act no differently from incumbents when faced with problem loans. Thus, these banking data provided support for justification rather than prospect theory as an explanation of escalation.
Direction of Effects
Although managerial turnover appeared to lead to subsequent actions toward problem loans, it was also useful to examine the reverse sequence of effects. If reversed effects were found, then our findings might simply be part of an ongoing causal sequence in which loan losses lead to turnover, and turnover in turn leads to further writeoffs. Examination of the data provided little evidence for such a sequence, however. Banks' provision for loan loss and net loan loss did not predict managerial turnover. No matter whether we used a 1-year, 2-year, or 3-year lag in financial data, there were no effects of provision and write-off on managerial turnover.
It is somewhat surprising that recognition of problem loans did not predict management turnover because firm performance has often been found to lead to the exit of managers (e.g., Allen & Panian, 1982; Dalton & Kesner, 1985; Osborn, Jauch, Martin, & Glueck, 1981) . Still, it should be noted that the effect of performance on turnover can be conditioned by the relative ability of executives to retain their positions (Pfeffer, 198Ib) . This sample of California banks included many institutions closely controlled or owned by management (overall, 38% of the stock was held by bank senior managers and directors). Therefore, it is possible that many bank executives were relatively insulated from pressures to resign following poor performance.
Process of Disengagement
Even though this study showed significant relationships between managerial turnover and coping with problem loans, there was still uncertainty about the exact mechanism underlying these effects. As hypothesized, managers with some prior responsibility for problem loans could have resisted withdrawing from them. By this reasoning, turnover may have lessened commitment to a losing course of action through the departure of those managers who had either originated problem loans or the policies that led to them.
The turnover effect could also have been due to the arrival of new managers. That is, recognition of loan losses may have been created by the addition of new managers rather than the subtraction of old managers. New management may have provided a fresher, more realistic view of the bank's loan portfolio. New arrivals could also have been more accurate in loan valuation because they were recruited specifically for their ability to deal with problem loans. Moreover, it is possible that taking over a portfolio of troubled loans comprises a condition that activates decision vigilance (Janis & Mann, 1977) , thus leading to a more cautious valuation of bank assets.
The finding that turnover effects were stronger for senior managers than for directors is consistent with the "departure" or justification explanation because operating managers are generally more responsible for prior decisions and policies than outside directors. The finding of somewhat stronger turnover effects when there was outside rather than inside replacement is also consistent with the "departure" or justification argument because inside personnel might have retained some association with prior decisions and policies. However, such a pattern of results is also consistent with the "arrival" or "new blood" argument. New senior executives are likely to provide a fresh perspective on coping with loan losses. And, these new operating managers are more likely to be able to implement changes in banks' reporting of loan losses than new arrivals among outside directors.
In our data on California banks, nearly all instances of turnover also constituted a managerial replacement. Therefore, it was impossible to provide a comparative test of different theoretical mechanisms underlying turnover effects. Interestingly, this same interpretative problem occurs in nearly all research on the effects of managerial turnover, although it has rarely been discussed. All we can conclude from the present data is that changing management was associated with greater disengagement from problem loans.
Sorting out the various mechanisms underlying turnover effects is an important task for future research. It will be necessary to study the effects of three conditions: departure, with no one entering as a replacement; full replacement, the standard turnover condition; and arrival, with no one exiting as a prerequisite. Only by comparing these three conditions with a control group will researchers be able to know whether arrival and departure are both necessary or if one of these mechanisms is sufficient to generate the consequences of turnover.
Macro Implications of Turnover
On a broader theoretical level, the turnover effects we found in this study can be seen as similar to those observed in the organizational strategy literature. Scholars concerned with strategic reorientation have noted that managerial turnover can be a principal means by which organizations move in new directions (e.g., Tushman & Romanelli, 1985) . New managers are typically expected to bring alternative perspectives to an organization, and the departure of long-tenured managers can make it possible for a firm to "unlearn" prior strategies (Nystrom & Starbuck, 1984) . The turnover of top executives may also provide a symbolic message to key organizational constituencies that prior policies and actions will no longer be followed and that there will be a discontinuous break with the past (Pfeffer, 198 la) . Empirical support for these ideas has come from several studies. Finkelstein and Hambrick (1990) found that longer tenured management teams tended to persist in their organizational strategies, avoiding experimentation and change. Virany, Irishman, and Romanelli (1992) observed that top management team turnover was significantly associated with strategic reorientation. Lant, Milliken, and Batra (1992) also found that CEO turnover led to subsequent changes in business strategy.
Some of the strategy literature cites escalation research as a basis for making predictions between managerial turnover and strategic change (e.g., Finkelstein & Hambrick, 1990; Milliken & Lant, 1991) . Yet the escalation literature seldom draws conclusions about organizational strategy. As this research has demonstrated, theories that are essentially "micro" or psychological in nature can be used to explain some portion of macro-level phenomena. This observation does not negate the complexity and interactive nature of organizational actions. Instead, it points to the feasibility of conducting further research along the lines of what Staw and Sutton (1993) have labeled as macro organizational psychology.
Conclusion
We began this article with a discussion of recent problems in the banking industry. We noted that the U.S. banking and S&L crises of the 1980s, as well as Japanese banking problems in the 1990s, were both characterized by huge quantities of bad debt. This research obviously had little to say about the origins of this debt (e.g., whether it was due to deficiencies in loan screening and approval processes or simply the severity of the recessions facing both the U.S. and Japanese economies). Our research was more concerned with the resolution of these debt crises: that is, how banks cope with the accumulation of problem loans.
It is generally assumed that banks should anticipate problems with loans in their portfolios, set aside funds for possible losses, and promptly write off losses when they occur (Brauns & Slater, 1978) . However, such careful management of loan portfolios does not always occur. U.S. banks long delayed recognizing problems with domestic and Latin American loans during the 1980s (e.g., "Worry at the World's banks," 1982; "Behind the banking turmoil," 1984). More recently, Japanese banks have been described as not adequately dealing with losses in their real estate portfolios because many properties in Tokyo have drastically decreased in value (Bremner et al., 1995; Holden, Daysog, & Glasgall, 1991) . Future research is needed to examine specific costs of delaying the recognition and write-off of loan losses. If Lewicki (1980) is correct in his description of "bad loan psychology," we might expect banks that fail to take adequate measures dealing with problem loans will suffer economically.
If coping with problem loans is indeed a requirement for financial recovery, then managerial turnover should be considered seriously as a turnaround tool. We can neither make precise recommendations from our data about the appropriate scope of managerial turnover nor can we say that organizations acting most quickly in replacing their management will be the ones that ultimately prosper. We can only state that the turnover of senior management will probably facilitate bank coping behaviors, that it will likely aid in recognizing and writing off bad loans.
If turnover seems too drastic a solution for some organizations or their management, it is possible that related deescalation techniques could accomplish similar ends.
Instead of forcing out long-tenured executives, a less painful solution may involve bifurcated decision procedures (Ross & Staw, 1991) . A key element of such a technique is the separation of initial and subsequent decision making concerning a course of action.
Some larger banks already follow the practice of taking the management of problem loans away from officers who originated these loans. Bad loans are assigned to "workout groups'' that are specifically charged with the task of recouping bank funds. From a comparison of two banks (with and without such a procedure), Lewicki (1980) suggested that work-out groups can reduce the problem of overcommitment to questionable loans. This observation still needs to be verified with a systematic sample of banks, and the power of such a deescalation technique should be compared with that of managerial turnover. On a broader level, research should also be directed toward finding out whether decision bifurcation affects escalation in other realms of organizational behavior. Should decision making be separated between new product development and funding, between hiring and promotion decisions, or between decisions regarding the management and possible discontinuation of a line of business? These are but a few of the questions that could be answered with further research on escalation in organizations.
